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Given that UK membership of the European Union is unsustainable, divorce is for the best. The Article 50
withdrawal agreement is the divorce settlement. As in all such marital breakdowns, there is a risk of 
bitter recrimination. 
Theresa May is already well-known for her lucid statements, such as "Brexit means Brexit". Another favourite
is her assurance that although quitting the EU, "Britain is not leaving Europe". She does not want
membership of the European Economic Area (on offer), nor associate membership of the EU (not on offer).
Instead, she wants a "new, strong, constructive partnership" with the EU, which is also both "equal" and
"strategic" (Lancaster House speech, 17 January). And she prefers bespoke tailoring to off-the-peg. 
From this we may glean that Brexit will not be the end of the story of Britain's many and varied continental
entanglements. In this paper I examine whether we can begin to look at the Article 50 process in a more
positive light – that is, whether Brexit could herald a new period of entente between Britain and Europe.
For this to happen, both parties need to spell out quickly and clearly what is within the bounds of 
the possible.
The EU 27 has necessary guidance from its Treaties, which it would be wise to heed. The broad goal is to
develop "a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and
good neighbourliness" (Article 8 TEU). More specifically, the EU may conclude an agreement with the UK
"establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special
procedure" (Article 217 TFEU). 
Mrs May's ministers, however, like latter-day British explorers, seem to be embarking on an intrepid
adventure with no clear idea where they are going. The prime minister is obviously worried that the
publication of a roadmap and itinerary would blow her cabinet and party apart. She should nevertheless
take comfort from the long-winded parliamentary debates at Westminster which suggest that there is ample
potential to build a decent cross-party consensus behind a prospectus for Britain's future relations with the
EU. However, she has only a few weeks left to set out her stall, including her concept of the "framework for
the future relationship" (Article 50(2)). She would be wise to ask President Tusk to try to reach an agreement
on that framework at the December 2017 meeting of the European Council (once the new German
government is in place). 
Meanwhile, both sides should nudge their way forward towards defining Britain's future landing zone. 
Mrs May's next opportunity to elucidate is when she triggers Article 50 in March. The European Council
2will have the chance to respond when it sets out its guidelines for the conduct of the negotiations at its
special meeting in April, as will the European Parliament in a preparatory report. The Commission will have
its turn in June when the official Article 50 negotiations actually begin. 
The institutions of a new partnership
Call it what you will – pact, concordat, pragmatic compromise – the treaty that emerges from the
negotiation will be unique. But if it is to deliver what the prime minister wants and encompass the range of
matters she proposes, including trade and security cooperation, it will be in similar territory to the
association agreements envisaged under Article 8 TEU. Familiarity with the concept of formal association
should make it easier for the EU 27 to reach a neighbourly deal with the British. A recent template for such
a thing already exists (signed by the UK as well as the EU 27 in 2014) with respect to Ukraine.1 An earlier
model is the UK's "intimate and enduring" association agreement with the European Coal and Steel
Community agreed between Churchill and Monnet in 1954.2
No matter the terminology, at the heart of any new agreement will be the comprehensive free trade area
already signalled by Mrs May. Britain's level of ambition in the matter of EU trade must be much higher and
the scope of its FTA much wider than that of the CETA, the recent minimalistic agreement with Canada. The
EU's new partnership with Britain will start from a point where no other FTA has begun: extensive economic
and regulatory convergence between economies deeply intertwined after 45 years of integration. 
What the prime minister does not, or dare not say is that future British access to the single market 
shorn of tariffs and tariff quotas requires strong institutions to supervise it. Traditional institutions used by
the EU to manage FTAs – a technical working group here and there   are unlikely to be sufficient to oversee 
this much deeper and dynamic relationship. Rather, a network of joint committees of trade officials will 
be needed, sector by sector, to supervise standards and to ensure approximate regulatory equivalence.
While British harmonisation with the EU acquis can be assured on day one after Brexit, divergence is 
bound to occur in the years to come as the EU 27 and their EEA partners continue to deepen 
market integration, notably in energy and services. British business must continue to be heavily involved in
the EU-wide trade and professional associations based in Brussels that shape the development of EU policy
and law-making. 
If Britain and the EU agree to follow the template of the association agreement, a council of association will
be required to sit on top of these sectoral committees, which may number about 30, to survey their progress
and settle disputes. The council will be empowered to alter the technical annexes to the partnership
agreement to reflect the dynamics of EU and UK law, ensuring regulatory convergence is maintained where
both wish it to be. Decision-making in the association council will be intergovernmental – that is to say,
nothing will be agreed that is not jointly agreed between the UK and the EU. British ministers will sit in the
association council alongside relevant members of the European Commission and the rotating presidency
of the EU Council of ministers.
Dispute resolution
In cases where it is not possible to reach political compromise, a dispute resolution mechanism will be
required. Lord Cockfield, the member of the Commission who drafted the plan for the European single
market, insisted that this was essential for ensuring that the terms of trade were respected and that 
member states would carry out their commitments properly. For the EU's internal purposes, this function 
is performed by the European Court of Justice (CJEU). A comparable mechanism is required if the new 
UK-EU agreement is to function satisfactorily for both parties. This should take the form of a judicial 
tribunal – to which businesses or either party to the agreement could bring cases – and which could issue
binding arbitration, empowering the aggrieved party to seek compensation or, ultimately, to suspend the
partnership agreement. 
One model for such a tribunal is found in the EFTA court which litigates disputes relating to the three non-
EU members of the EEA. It regards itself as a 'sister court' to that of the CJEU, and both courts work hard to
maintain consistency of judgment. Alan Dashwood recommends that the EFTA court is borrowed by the
UK-EU agreement, but other models are available.3 A simple judicial tribunal of three judges – one from
each party plus a neutral third – would, for example, do the trick, thereby liberating the UK from the direct
jurisdiction of the CJEU which appears to be one of Mrs May's main political objectives. Unlike the CJEU,
the judgments of the joint tribunal would not have direct effect on the laws of either the EU or the UK,
although both parties would use their best endeavours to comply with tribunal rulings as part of their
commitment to respect international law. Unsolvable disputes between the UK and the EU would end up
either under WTO arbitration or ultimately at the International Court in The Hague. 
Projecting security
Having a stab at free trade will not be enough of a basis for a durable and settled special relationship
between the EU and Britain. The EU's association agreements involve a level of political commitment to
developing a strategic partnership, by both sides. Their institutional apparatus is designed to facilitate trustful
diplomacy based on common values and principles. No special relationship with a neighbour will be more
important for the EU than the one it manages to establish with Great Britain. 
The UK-EU council would have oversight of the elements of political cooperation in the fields of foreign
and security policy and of justice and home affairs. Problems of Britain's patchy connection with the EU's
fast-changing immigration, asylum and border control policies would be addressed in this forum. As would
preparation for G7 and G20 summits, and the coordination of positions at the UN and in international
climate change conferences. The joint commitment to combat together terrorism and organised crime
would be often on the agenda. 
In the hierarchy of the partnership agreement, above the association council would be annual summit
meetings between the British prime minister and the presidents of the EU institutions. Below the council
would be a joint parliamentary committee of MEPs and an equal number of British MPs, peers and, possibly,
members of the devolved assemblies. This parliamentary element would be very important in keeping the
UK engaged in the political life of the European Union. Alongside the official bodies could be a consultative
committee composed of representatives of the social partners and organised civil society. 
Making the transition
Once, but only once the framework for the future relationship is agreed upon will it be possible to advance
the discussion on transition. At the outset, quite rightly, Michel Barnier sees the need for transitional
arrangements in order to phase out those of Britain's obligations that will not be guillotined at the
bewitching hour when the Brits leave the EU institutions and the Union Jack is lowered at the Berlaymont.
These legacy issues will primarily involve the EU budget, but there will also be other matters to disentangle,
such as the UK's diminishing adherence to EU regulation and the balance to be struck between the UK's
rights and obligations with regard to international treaties to which both the EU and its member states are
party. On these and other doubtless unexpected questions, more time for phasing out will be necessary if a
legal vacuum is to be avoided and collateral damage minimised. 
If the European Council has been able to agree with the British that the best framework for their future
relationship is a treaty of association (call it what you will), the transitional period can also be used for the
phasing in of regulations that will bridge the gap, in the interest of continuity and legal certainty, between
Brexit and the conclusion and entry into force of the new agreement. 
In my view, a dedicated transitional authority will need to be established to monitor and supervise the Brexit
process and to manage inevitable legacy difficulties over an indefinite period. Such an EU-UK transition
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agency, with a small joint secretariat, would be charged with coordinating the dismantling of the UK's ties
to the EU with the passage and implementation of the Great Repeal Bill and the setting up of the new
regulatory regime in Whitehall. 
The creation of the transition authority would be provided for in the Article 50 withdrawal agreement. As
and when a new partnership treaty is concluded, the transition authority could easily morph into the
secretariat of the association council, and it would be given new powers at that stage to encourage
economic development and political cooperation between Britain and Europe. 
In the longer term, who knows where this entente between Britain and Europe would lead? But it would
surely be somewhere better and brighter than any obvious alternative. 
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1 See my evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee on the Ukraine Association Agreement,
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-future-
trade-between-the-uk-and-the-eu/written/43513.html
2 http://andrewduff.blogactiv.eu/2016/09/01/intimate-and-enduring-britains-first-association-agreement-with-europe/
3 https://infacts.org/eea-good-model-dispute-resolution-post-brexit/
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